INTRODUCTION
During the last thirty years, the composition of families in the United States has changed dramatically. In 1960, less than 10 percent of families with children were headed by a single mother, while in 1990 more than 20 percent of families with children were female-headed households (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1961 Census , 1991a . These trends are common to both white and black families, although the increase among black families has been more dramatic. There have also been sizable increases in the number of out-of-wedlock births and teenage pregnancies among blacks and whites. In 1989, fully two-thirds of all births among blacks were to unmarried mothers (U.S. House of Representatives 1992).
One reason why this increase in the percentage of families headed by single women is of concern is because the economic well-being of single-parent families is typically below that of two-parent families.
In 1990, the poverty rate among female-headed households with children was 45 percent compared to the rate of 8 percent among two-parent families (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1991b). Over half of all families in poverty are now accounted for by female-headed households. This disproportionate representation of female-headed households among the poor population has led to the term "feminization of poverty." Not only are female heads of household more likely to be poor in a given year, but they are also more likely to have longer spells of poverty (Bane and Ellwood 1986) and are disproportionately represented among the persistently poor (Duncan 1984) . There is evidence that these trends are being transmitted through generations: female children raised in female-headed households are more likely to drop out of high school, have an out-of-wedlock birth, and become heads of household themselves (McLanahan 1988) . 1 These trends have stimulated a large body of research exploring the potential explanations for these striking changes in family structure. Much of the research has focused on the role of the U.S. welfare 2 In some states, benefits are available to eligible two-parent families under the AFDC-Unemployed 2 Parent (UP) program. However, the eligibility requirements are more restrictive. At least one parent in the two-parent family must have a history of a significant attachment to the labor market and cannot be working more than 100 hours per month. Despite the fact that twenty-six states provided benefits under the UP program in 1991, only 6 percent of the caseload received benefits under the UP program. The Family Support Act of 1988 requires that all states set up UP programs by 1990. Hoynes (forthcoming) examines the effects of AFDC-UP on labor supply and welfare participation; Winkler (1993) considers the effect of expanding the UP program on family structure.
See Garfinkel and McLanahan (1986) and Ellwood and Crane (1990) for a summary of literature 3 that explores the role of changes in labor markets on family composition. Espenshade (1985) provides a general overview of the determinants of trends in marital rates. system on family structure decisions. The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program provides cash benefits primarily to single parents with children, and eligibility in the program is restricted to those families with both low income and low asset levels. In addition, all AFDC participants are 2 eligible to receive benefits through the food stamp and Medicaid programs. Because these benefits are generally not available to two-parent families, it is argued that the U.S. welfare system encourages divorce, separation, and the delay of marriage and remarriage (for example, see Murray 1984) . Other explanations for the increase in female headship over the last two decades include the reduction in the number of marriageable men (resulting in sex ratio imbalances) because of high unemployment, incarceration, and mortality rates (Wilson and Neckerman 1986) ; the increase in female employment; and the fall in relative wages between men and women. 3 It is of policy interest to determine to what extent our welfare system contributes to the increasing number of female-headed households. Becker (1973 Becker ( , 1974 Becker ( , 1981 presents a model of marriage whereby women choose marriage (or female headship) by comparing the utility inside and outside marriage. An implication of this model is that higher AFDC benefits (generally available only outside marriage) will lead to higher rates of female headship. AFDC benefits are set at the state level and exhibit enormous variation across states. In 1991, maximum benefits for a family of three ranged from $694 in California and $680 in Connecticut, to $288 in Indiana and $120 in Mississippi (U.S. House of Representatives 1992).
Women who live in states with relatively high AFDC benefits, therefore, should be more likely to choose female headship then women who live in relatively low benefit states.
This interstate variation in benefits forms the basis for estimating the effect of AFDC on female headship. As reviewed in Moffitt (1992) , most studies use cross-sectional data and estimate a female headship equation as a function of individual characteristics, benefits, and, in some studies, other state characteristics. The results from this research are mixed. As summarized in Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma 1983 , the early literature found insignificant effects of the welfare system on family structure. More recent evidence implies that the welfare system has a positive and significant, yet modest, effect on the propensity to form female-headed households (Danziger et al. 1982; Ellwood and Bane 1985; Moffitt 1990a; Hoffman, Duncan, and Mincy 1991; Schultz 1994; Winkler 1993 ).
There are three reasons why the welfare effect from these studies may be biased. First, social norms, cultural effects, and religious influences are likely to play an important role in family structure decisions, and are largely unobservable to the researcher. As discussed by Ellwood and Bane (1985) , if these largely unobservable influences are correlated with the state welfare benefit, then, appealing to standard omitted variable bias arguments, the welfare benefit effect will be biased. For example, if the population in a given state believes strongly in the two-parent family, the state may not have much support for an AFDC program and, hence, offer low benefits. Or a state which is more accepting of nontraditional family structures may favor a higher level of support for female-headed households. In a cross-sectional study you cannot identify both state fixed effects and welfare effects. Formally, if welfare benefits are correlated with unmeasured state attitudes, estimates from these studies will be biased. If the unmeasured effects are positively (negatively) correlated with welfare benefits, then the estimated welfare effect will overestimate (underestimate) the true effect.
Two studies provide evidence that ignoring state effects can lead to incorrect conclusions about the impact of welfare on female headship. Ellwood and Bane (1985) include an estimate of the likely welfare benefit (instead of simply welfare benefits) by adjusting the benefit for the likelihood of receiving AFDC 4 Besley and Case (1994) derive the bias that results from omitting these policy determinants under 4 several standard models in the literature (e.g., fixed-effect models and difference-in-difference models). They point out that controlling for observable determinants of policy may not be sufficient since unobservable determinants may be correlated with the error in the headship equation. They propose an instrumental variables approach to estimating the effect of policy on individual outcomes. In practice, they find it difficult to find good instruments for identifying the policy determination equation.
benefits if single parenthood is chosen. By creating intrastate variation in benefits, they estimate a benefit effect while controlling for state effects. Moffitt (1994) estimates a model of female headship using state fixed effects and controls for state AFDC benefits. He is able to identify both effects by pooling several cross sections of the Current Population Survey. Moffitt finds that adding state effects changes the benefit effect for white women from positive and significant to negative and significant. Interestingly, for black women, the state effects did not matter.
A second potential problem is the endogeneity of state policy. Besley and Case (1994) , using the example of workers' compensation benefits, explore the possibility that state policy is affected by political and economic conditions, and voter preferences. They argue that if these policy determinants are related to the variable of interest, their omission can lead to erroneous conclusions as to the importance of policy.
While the determinants of state AFDC benefits have been examined (Darity and Myers 1983; Plotnick and Winters 1985; Moffitt 1990b ), they have not been incorporated in the empirical literature on the effects of welfare on family structure. If these policy-setting variables are related to female headship, then omitting these variables may also lead to biased estimates of the AFDC effect.
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A third problem is the importance of omitted individual effects. There are important determinants of individual family composition decisions, such as marriage and female headship, which are not observed by the researcher. It is possible that these omitted effects may be correlated with the generosity of AFDC benefits through selected migration over time. This would result in a correlation between welfare benefit levels and the distribution of the population with respect to the propensity to be a female head. This has not been examined in the literature.
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This study takes as its starting point that omitting state effects may lead to a bias in the estimated effect of AFDC on female headship decisions. I explore why state effects matter for estimating the role of welfare in female headship decisions by examining the importance of individual effects and policy endogeneity. A natural explanation for why state effects matter is that the composition of the population across the states differs, and the composition is related to the generosity of the state's welfare program.
The interpretation of the state effect in this case is some average of the attitudes of its population. If that is true, then controlling for individual effects should have the same result as controlling for state effects.
Second, the endogeneity of AFDC policy is examined by including controls representing the determinants of state welfare generosity. To do this, data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is used to estimate a model of female headship controlling for welfare benefits, characteristics of the woman, characteristics of the state, year effects, state effects, and individual effects. Pooled cross-sectional data allow for the identification of a welfare effect and a state effect. Panel data, containing observations on persons over time, allow for the identification of welfare, state, and individual effects.
The results of the analysis imply controlling for unmeasured individual effects has a dramatic effect on estimates of the role of welfare in family structure. The bias in the estimated welfare effect for whites can be attributed to either omitted state or individual effects. After controlling for individual effects, there is no impact of either state fixed effects or other state variables on the estimated welfare effect. Among blacks, individual effects matter, but, consistent with previous studies, state effects do not.
Overall, once the model is correctly specified to include individual effects, there is no evidence that welfare contributes to increasing propensities to form female-headed households for either whites or blacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the existing literature on female headship. Section 3 presents the economic model and empirical implementation. Section 4 discusses the data used in the analysis. Section 5 presents the results. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 6.
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For a summary of the literature on the effect of welfare on various measures of family composition, 5 see Moffitt 1992.
Reviews of this literature can be found in Groeneveld, Hannan, and Tuma 1983; Bishop 1980; 6 Wilson and Neckerman 1986; and Garfinkel and McLanahan 1986. 
PREVIOUS EVIDENCE ON THE ROLE OF AFDC ON FEMALE HEADSHIP
There has been a great deal of research exploring possible explanations for the recent trends in the family structure in the United States. The current discussion, however, is limited to summarizing the existing evidence on the effect of welfare programs on female headship. Other studies explore the role of welfare on the probability of divorce (Hoffman and Duncan 1993; Dechter 1992) , remarriage (Hoffman and Duncan 1988) , subfamily formation (Ellwood and Bane 1985; Hutchens, Jakubson, and Schwartz 1989) , transitions to female headship (McLanahan 1988) , and out-of-wedlock childbearing (Ellwood and Bane 1985; Plotnick 1990; Duncan and Hoffman 1990 ).
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The early literature on the effects of AFDC on female headship is based primarily on state, SMSA, or city-level analyses. The results from this literature are mixed and find no compelling evidence that AFDC has a significant effect on female headship decisions. The more recent literature, using a variety of 6 cross-sectional data sets, shows a significant and positive, but modest, effect of welfare on female headship. Danziger et al. (1982) , used data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and provide the first formalization and estimation of Becker's (1973 Becker's ( , 1974 Becker's ( , 1981 model of marital formation. They estimated the earnings and income available in both marriage and female headship and found significant effects of AFDC. Schultz (1994) such as divorce, separation, out-of-wedlock births, and teenage pregnancy have been analyzed in this same framework. The following comments about the potential bias in the estimated benefit effect also apply to those studies.
Ellwood and Bane use a two-step procedure. They estimated an AFDC participation equation for all 8 female heads of household in the sample. The estimates from that equation were used to predict participation probabilities for each woman in the sample. The benefit variable in the female headship equation is then replaced with "likely" benefits by multiplying benefits by the estimated participation probability. Because this method relies on a sample of female heads of household to estimate the participation effect, any correlations between the participation decision and female headship decision could create a bias in the estimated participation probabilities. For example, if female heads of household are more likely to participate in AFDC for unmeasurable reasons, then this method will overestimate the participation probabilities for married women. (Moffitt 1990a; Winkler 1993) . Because these studies rely on cross-state variation in the welfare benefits to estimate the welfare effect, they are likely to suffer from the three sources of bias due to omission of state and individual effects and controls for policy determination. If these unobservable effects are correlated with the benefit variable, then, using standard omitted variable arguments, there will be a bias in the estimated welfare effect.
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There is evidence concerning the importance of omitting state effects. The few studies that have attempted to correct for unmeasured state influences show significant effects on the estimated welfare effect. Ellwood and Bane (1985) were the first to raise the issue of the potential bias in the welfare estimate. headship, out-of-wedlock childbearing) welfare was found to have the largest effect on the probability of living independently. Moffitt (1994) uses over twenty years of pooled cross-sectional data from the CPS to estimate a female headship model with fixed and random state effects. Controlling for unmeasurable state effects was found to diminish the role of welfare for whites but to increase the estimated welfare effect for blacks. There has not been any examination of the importance of individual effects.
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It is not clear how they identify the effects of AFDC since they did not indicate any instruments for 9 the AFDC determination equation. The instruments for female headship are unemployment rates and population ratios.
The endogeneity of area policies have been examined in other applications. Besley and Case 10 (1994) consider the effect of workers' compensation benefits on labor market outcomes, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1986) consider the effect of family planning programs on health outcomes, and Poterba (1994) considers how states respond to periods of fiscal crisis. Darity and Myers (1983) , Plotnick and Winters (1985) , and Moffitt (1990b) examine the determinants of AFDC benefits. Plotnick and Winters (1985) consider the determinants of state-level AFDC benefits and find that higher benefits are associated with states with higher per capita income, higher density of the poor population, higher welfare recipiency rates, lower levels of illegitimacy among recipients, and lower food stamp levels. Darity and Myers consider a simultaneous model of female headship and benefit determination using annual time series data for the United States. They find that after controlling for the endogeneity of benefits, AFDC does not influence marriage rates. Moffitt (1990b) 9 found higher state income and lower food stamp benefits to be associated with higher AFDC benefits. 
AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF AFDC AND FEMALE HEADSHIP
The fundamental theory of marital formation and dissolution was developed by Becker (1973 Becker ( , 1974 Becker ( , 1981 and most empirical studies of family formation begin with some version of his model.
Becker's model is based on the proposition that a woman will choose marriage when the economic benefits (or utility) inside marriage exceed the economic benefits outside marriage. His theory implies that marriage is particularly advantageous if there is specialization between the partners. That is, one partner specializes in market work while the other specializes in home production. Implications of this model are that increases in the earnings or wages of the potential spouse will increase the probability of marriage while increases in any benefits available outside marriage, such as welfare benefits, will decrease the probability of marriage. Extensions of Becker's model show that an increase in the woman's wage can have
Becker focuses on the independence effect as the main implication of increasing women's labor 11 market opportunities. An increase in earnings of the woman implies that the gains to specialization are reduced, which will have a negative impact on the probability of marriage.
The main benefits of the U.S. welfare system for families include cash benefits under the Aid to
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Families with Dependent Children program and in-kind benefits through the food stamp and Medicaid programs. In some circumstances, these benefits are available to two-parent families. While the empirical implementation will take this into account, the remainder of this theoretical discussion will assume, for simplicity, that benefits are available only to single mothers.
This is a myopic model of marriage where the utility is reevaluated each period. A dynamic model 13 of marital status based on a search model is a natural extension, but has yet to be developed in the literature.
(1) (2) an ambiguous effect on the probability of marriage. On one hand, an increase in earnings of the woman increases family income, which can have a stabilizing effect on the marriage. But this increase in earnings also facilitates independence from the husband, which can lead to a decrease in marriage. Ross and 11 Sawhill (1975) refer to these two effects as the income and independence effects.
In the spirit of Becker's model, consider the determinants of the discrete choice of female headship versus marriage. The utility function, represents the maximum utility associated with choosing female headship (FH=1) or marriage (FH=0). and W need to be estimated. The approach used in the literature is to estimate a wage equation based m on the sample of spouses of married women and to use those estimates to predict the spouse's wages for the entire sample of women (Danziger et al. 1982; Schultz 1994; Duncan and Hoffman 1990; Hoffman, Duncan, and Mincy 1991) . The covariates used to estimate the wage equation include characteristics of the wife, and local labor market variables. Estimating earnings or income in the counterfactual state, however, can be problematic. We observe only the wage of the spouse for those women who are married, and if there are unobservable factors that affect female headship which also affect the earnings of the potential spouse, then this method will yield biased estimates for the wage estimates. For example, if women who are married have higher marriage opportunities, then we will overestimate spouse's wages for female heads of household. While fully accounting for this correlation in the unobservable components requires estimating a simultaneous model, a two-stage estimation method has been used (Schultz 1994; Duncan and Hoffman 1990 ).
This reduced form approach has been used frequently in the literature (Ellwood and Bane 1985; 15 Moffitt 1990a 15 Moffitt , 1994 Winkler 1993) .
In order to evaluate the probability that a woman chooses female headship or marriage, we need to know the woman's wage and her spouse or potential spouse's wage. However, the difficulty is that we observe a spouse's wage only if the woman is married and the spouse is working, and we observe a woman's wage only if she is working. If we assume that wages are a function of the woman's characteristics (X) and labor market variables (L), then we can replace both wage variables by their determinants. Therefore, the effect of earnings of the woman and her potential spouse enter implicitly through their determinants. While the 14 results from this reduced form model cannot be used to determine the importance of changes in the employment and earnings of men and women, they are appropriate to explore the role of welfare benefits in the presence of regional or state effects.
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Assuming a linear form for the indirect utility function and adding an error term, the difference in utility becomes:
where the subscripts its correspond to individual i in period t living in state s. effects are correlated with benefits, and the substantive results change when they are included (Ellwood and Bane 1985; Moffitt 1994) . In this study, the focus is on examining why state effects matter. One hypothesis that will be explored is that states differ in the composition of their population, which is in turn correlated with the state benefit level. One interpretation of a "state" effect is that it represents an aggregation of the preferences of the state residents. If so, then controlling for individual effects should 12 to be presented later discounts the importance of the latter interpretation.
Chamberlain (1980) shows that a fixed-effects conditional logit model can be used to estimate 18 individual fixed effects in a discrete choice model. The conditional likelihood approach implies that the fixed effects are identified by the switchers (e.g., those who transition between female-head and nonfemale-head status) in the data set. In this application, the sample size of switchers is not sufficient to implement this approach.
The mixed logit model cannot be used to examine the hypothesis that omitted individual variables 19 are driving the state fixed-effect results because, by definition, the discrete distribution describing the individual effects is assumed to be independent of the covariates in the model.
have the same impact (on the estimated welfare effect) as controlling for the state effects. If families move over time, however, then the state effects will not necessarily capture the same influences as the individual effects. Therefore, if sufficient numbers of families move over the course of the PSID data (interstate migration is observed in the PSID), then individual effects can be identified independently of state effects.
A second hypothesis is that the state welfare policy is endogenous. In particular, suppose that state benefits are influenced by economic, demographic, and political variables captured in Z . Omission of ts these variables may also lead to a bias in the estimated welfare effect.
Most of the literature follows the approach in (4) but, because of the reliance on a single crosssectional data set, does not identify the components of the error structure in (5). In the current application, the use of panel data allows for the identification of both state and individual effects.
A linear probability model (LPM) is used to estimate the female headship equation using the error structure in (5). The error components are estimated as fixed effects using standard panel estimation procedures (for example, see Tsaio 1986 ). The LPM model is used because of the infeasibility of estimating the probit or logit models with individual fixed effects for this application. The limits to using 18 the LPM, however, are well-known (for example, see Maddala 1983) . To check the sensitivity to the LPM assumption, some specifications of the model are estimated using a mixed logit model with state fixed effects and individual random effects (Heckman and Singer 1984) . The likelihood function for the mixed logit model is presented in Appendix A. include only those living without a spouse or partner. Note that there is some inconsistency in identifying subfamilies in the PSID. It is not until a woman "splits off" and creates her own household that she may be identified as a subfamily head. For example, if a woman is living with her parents at the start of the sample, and she has her own child, she is not identified as a subfamily head. However, if she leaves her parent's household and then returns, she would be identified as a subfamily head from that point on. This could cause sample selection problems because we include only those women who leave their parents' household and then return. 
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The total cash value of the three programs is assigned to be 70 percent of the maximum AFDC 21 benefit plus the food stamp maximum benefit plus 36.8 percent of the average Medicaid expenditure. The Medicaid benefit is calculated as the state's average Medicaid benefits for a family of four. The 70 percent results from AFDC income being "taxed" in calculating the food stamp benefit. Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) Weighted statistics for the sample data are summarized for white women in Table 1 and for black women in Table 2 . There are a total of 35,517 observations for whites and 24,423 observations for blacks.
Over the sample period, 14 percent of white women in the sample were female heads compared to 51 15 percent of blacks. The PSID data show increasing trends in headship over the sample period where both whites and blacks saw a near doubling in the incidence of female headship over the period. Tables 1 and 2 show that female heads of household are more likely to have lower education levels, have smaller families, and live in an SMSA. Black women with children are more likely to have lower education levels and larger families than whites. Religion of the head, which is likely to be correlated with headship status, is provided in the PSID. The majority of black women are Baptist while white women are more likely to be Protestant or Catholic. Female heads of household, especially blacks, are more likely to live in areas with higher unemployment rates, higher wages, higher state income, and a greater Republican party presence in the state government. Using AFDC alone gives a deceptive picture of trends in the generosity of "welfare" because growth in one program can, to some extent, offset decline in another. In the empirical work that follows, the results
are not sensitive to the definition of welfare benefits. 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 Year AFDC AFDC+FS+Medicaid During much of this period, California was the only major state where AFDC benefits were 24 automatically adjusted for changes in the cost of living. Typically, benefits are nominally set by state legislatures and benefits remain fixed in nominal terms for periods of several years.
Comparing the trend in benefits to the trend in female headship in Figure 2 , it appears that benefits tracked female headship quite closely until the mid-1970s. Since then, real benefits have declined while the headship rate has increased. This point has been made in the time-series literature. However, other factors may have changed since the mid-1970s which may still leave a role for welfare.
In the state fixed-effects model, the welfare effect is identified by within-state variation in benefits over time. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate that there are significant differences in the trends across the states. Figure 3 shows real AFDC benefits for four moderate-to high-benefit states with large welfare caseloads.
Illinois was a very high-benefit state in 1968 (4th-highest ranked state) and is now one of the lowest benefit states outside of the south (ranked 22nd overall). California was an average state in 1968 (ranked 23rd) but had risen to become one of highest benefit states by the end of the period. Figure 4 shows the 24 trends for three low-benefit states. While Mississippi has consistently been one of the lowest benefit states over the entire period, Texas has fallen from modest benefits (ranked 12th in 1968) to one of the lowest benefit states in the country (ranked 3rd from the bottom, above Alabama and Mississippi).
RESULTS
This section presents estimates for the female headship model described in section 3. The sample consists of all married women or female heads of household who are between the ages of 16 and 50 and who have children. The dependent variable is equal to one if the woman is a female head, and equal to zero otherwise. Because headship patterns differ quite substantially for blacks and whites (Ellwood and Crane 1990; Danziger et al. 1982; Hoffman, Duncan, and Mincy 1991; Moffitt 1990a Moffitt , 1994 , separate equations are estimated for white and black women. To account for non-random sample composition, all regressions are 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 Year White Black Real AFDC Benefits (1982 ( Dollars) 1968 ( 1970 ( 1972 ( 1974 ( 1976 ( 1978 ( 1982 1988 Year California Illinois Maryland Michigan Real AFDC Benefits (1982 ( Dollars) 1968 ( 1970 ( 1972 ( 1974 ( 1976 ( 1978 ( 1982 ( 1988 Year Mississippi Georgia Texas
Figure 4 Trends in AFDC Benefits for Selected Low Benefit States
In UP states, benefits are potentially available both inside and outside of marriage. Consequently, 25 it is possible that the effect of benefits on family structure will differ in states offering AFDC-UP benefits versus non-UP states. In results not shown, interacting the AFDC-UP dummy with the benefit variable results in the expected negative coefficient on the AFDC-UP dummy. This was also found by Winkler (1993) .
In general, one should take care in interpreting these effects as causal. Female heads may prefer to 26 live in SMSAs because of availability of services, jobs, or other factors. estimated using the sample weights. Standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary correlation over time using the correction of Huber (1967) . The linear probability model is estimated accounting for heteroscedasticity due to the use of a discrete dependent variable in a linear model (Maddala 1983 ).
Estimates for White Women
Parameter estimates for the headship equation for white women based on the linear probability model are provided in Table 3 . Model (1) White women with less than a high school education are more than twice as likely to be female heads than high school graduates. Living in an SMSA increases the female headship probability by 25 percent.
26
Unemployment rates and average wages are not important determinants of female headship outcomes. 
Time effects are included to control for changes in

25
A state was included in the state sample if there were observations for at least 75 women over the 27 course of the panel. These states were not selected based on the composition of female heads versus married women. These states account for about 75 percent of total welfare caseload or about 70 percent of all white families with children. social norms and show a consistent upward trend. These time effects are jointly significant at the 1 percent level.
The remaining models in Table 3 examine the role of state and individual effects. Due to small sample sizes in some states, these results are estimated on a subset of the full sample, including 21 states, for a total of 27,532 observations. (The characteristics of the state subsample are presented in appendix 27 Table B1 .) Models (2) and (3) present specifications with and without division dummies. The welfare effect in this subsample is somewhat higher but the marginal effects for most other covariates are similar.
Adding the fixed effects for the states, as presented in (4) In order to confirm the robustness of these results to the functional form assumption, a logit model was also estimated. These estimates, presented in appendix Table A1, confirm that adding state effects Table   A1 adds discrete individual random effects to account for a common disturbance in the panel (Heckman and Singer 1984) . These results imply that, in the absence of state effects, increasing benefits by $100 leads to a 7 percent increase in the probability of being a female head of household.
The remainder of the table provides strong evidence that for whites, state effects are capturing differences in the composition of the population across the states. Adding individual fixed effects, as shown in (5), has virtually the same impact on the estimated welfare effect as adding state fixed effects-the coefficient on AFDC benefits becomes small (actually turns negative) and insignificant. Once individual effects are included, adding state effects does not change the parameter of interest. The state effects are still important (for example, they are still jointly significant at the 1 percent level) but they do not influence the estimated welfare effect. This result is good news for applications when only pooled cross-sectional information is available, in that controlling for state effects is sufficient to account for population heterogeneity across states.
It is worth considering more formally why we might expect state and individual effects to have a differential impact on the estimated welfare effect. Suppose that no families moved over the course of the PSID panel. Then controls for state of residence, through state fixed effects, would have the same influence on the welfare effect as the individual effects. This is because welfare benefits vary only by state and, in the event that no households move across states, all that we have to identify the state effects is the individual effects of its residents. In that case, we would expect specifications (4) and (5) to have the same coefficient on welfare benefits. In other words, the correlation between welfare benefits and state effects would be equal to the correlation between benefits and individual effects. We do, however, observe families moving between states in the PSID data. Among the sample of female heads of household, about 9 percent of blacks and 16 percent of whites move at some time over the two decades covered by the PSID. This migration implies that the composition of the population within a state is not fixed, and therefore, individual effects and state effects can have different impacts on the estimated welfare effect.
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The first specification in Table 4 drops the labor market controls that have been included in all 28 specifications in Table 3 .
As noted by Besley and Case (1994) , even if the omission of these state level determinants of 29 AFDC benefits do not bias the estimated welfare effect, correlation between the unobservable elements could still lead to a bias. This is unlikely due to the lack of evidence based on observable influences.
AFDC caseload per capita is potentially endogenous. If it is dropped from the regression the results do not change substantially. Table 3 with no controls for state effects. The lower panel of the table reestimates these models with state effects. Each specification in Table 4 also includes all individual and family controls used in Table 3 but they are omitted for brevity. These estimates imply that higher rates of female headship are found in 28 states with proportionally fewer children, fewer elderly, and more AFDC cases per capita, and states with higher unemployment rates and average wages. The political variables (dummy for Republican governor and proportion of state houses held by Republicans) do not appear to be important. Despite their ability to explain variation in female headship patterns, these results do not provide strong evidence for the endogeneity of welfare benefits. Specification (2) in Table 4 shows that adding controls for economic variables (including AFDC caseload per capita) reduces the size of the welfare effect. This is primarily due to the inclusion of the labor market controls (unemployment rate and average wage) that were included in the earlier specifications in Table 3 . Adding demographic and political variables as additional policy determination variables has no impact on the estimated welfare effect.
Estimates for Black Women
Results for the linear probability model are presented in Table 5 . The estimates for the full sample with division dummies, Model (1), show that the determinants of female headship for blacks differ substantially from the estimates reported for whites. The benefit effect is significantly larger among blacks than it is for whites. For blacks, a $100 increase in welfare benefits increases the headship probability by 
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The state subsample for blacks contains all states with at least 50 women at some point during the 30 panel. These states account for about 88 percent of all black families with children. The means of this subsample are presented in appendix Table B2 .
Because of the unequal distribution of the black population, some census divisions are poorly 31 represented in the black state subsample. This affects the interpretation of the estimated division dummies in model (3). Accordingly, model (2) without division dummies is the base model for the state sample.
As a specification check, these models were also estimated using a logit model with random 32 effects. The results of the mixed logit model, presented in appendix Table A2 , match the linear model results quite closely. over two percentage points, or 7 percent. The larger welfare effect for blacks may be a result of blacks having a greater likelihood of taking up benefits as female heads. Previous studies have found greater welfare benefits for blacks (Ellwood and Bane 1985; Moffitt 1990a; Hoffman, Duncan, and Mincy 1991; Moffitt 1994) as well as greater welfare effects among lower-education groups within racial groups (Moffitt 1990a (Moffitt , 1994 Winkler 1993) . The effect of other covariates is similar to that found for whites.
The state subsample for blacks contains 23,749 observations in 21 states. Model (2) shows that 30 the results for the state subsample do not differ substantially compared to estimates for the entire sample.
The remaining models add state and individual effects. In sharp contrast to the estimates for whites, 31 controlling for state effects, as shown in Model (4), has almost no effect on welfare benefit estimates. The coefficient on AFDC benefits is 0.032 compared to 0.028 without any state effects. Figure 6 shows the lack of correlation between the estimated state fixed effects and average welfare benefits by state. The correlation coefficient is -0.07. This weak negative correlation is due to a few low-benefit states (Georgia, Florida) that have relatively large state effects.
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As suggested earlier, it is possible that the state effects are capturing other characteristics of the state welfare program not being captured by the welfare benefit. However, this would imply similar values for the state effects in the regressions on blacks and whites, which is not found. Among the 15 states common to the black and white state subsamples, the correlation between the state effects is weakly positive but insignificant The remaining specifications in Table 5 show that unobserved individual effects are correlated with the state benefit level. Adding individual effects (Model 5) reduces the magnitude of the welfare effect from a positive and significant 0.028 to a statistically insignificant 0.001. By omitting a control for unobserved individual characteristics, we overestimate the role of welfare in the propensity to be a female head of household. Similarly to whites, adding state effects to this model has no impact on estimated welfare effects.
There are two important points to draw from the results for blacks. First, omitting individual effects can lead-erroneously-to the conclusion that AFDC benefits matter for female headship decisions. The composition of black women across the states (with respect to their propensity to choose female headship) is correlated with the state welfare benefit. This can be explained by migration to states with higher welfare benefits. Second, state effects for blacks are not correlated with welfare benefits. This is consistent with a situation in which black women are influenced by some social, cultural, or religious norms at the state level (the state effects are significant) but these community norms do not affect the policy process leading to higher welfare benefits. This may be because of lack of political power in this group.
The importance of individual fixed effects can be explained by differential migration among blacks. About 9 percent of black families in the sample moved at some time during the twenty-two years in the PSID sample. Several facts provide evidence of differential migration. On average, families that move are moving to higher-benefit states. Those who moved found their benefits to be 1.5 percent higher than they would have been if they had stayed. Further, those with a higher propensity to be female head of household (a higher value for ) experience a larger increase in real benefits relative to those with a lower i propensity to be a female head of household. These results imply that the positive relationship between welfare benefits and female headship that has been found in previous studies is a result of a composition effect achieved through welfare-induced migration over time. There is no evidence of a causal relationship between welfare benefits and female headship.
This represents a very indirect way of getting at the importance of welfare benefits in migration decisions. There is, however, a sizable literature that examines this issue and shows a modest and statistically significant effect of welfare on migration decisions (for example, see recent reviews in Moffitt 1992 and Walker 1994) . The main exception is Walker (1994) , who finds no evidence of migration to three high-benefit states from the (locally) low-benefit states with which they share borders. Once we control for individual effects, the estimated welfare effect is small and statistically insignificant. This can be explained by higher propensities for welfare-induced migration by women with greater likelihood of becoming female heads of household, independent of the welfare system. This suggests that a study examining the determinants of interstate migration patterns of black women would be useful.
These results have important implications for the literature on welfare and female headship. This study clearly shows that there is no evidence that AFDC benefits play any role in female headship decisions. More generally, the study also underscores the importance of close examination of results that rely on interstate variation when the regression may contain unmeasured state effects.
Appendix A Likelihood Function for Mixed Logit Model
Assume that the individual effect in (5) 
